ABSTRACT Radio frequency identification (RFID) has a wide range of applications, such as traffic management, access control, and supply chain management. Designing secure and efficient (i.e., practical) ownership transfer schemes remains a topic of ongoing challenge to supply chain vendors. In this paper, we propose the first RFID ownership transfer protocol based on Chebshev polynomials. The exchange properties of Chebyshev polynomials allow our proposed scheme to achieve data integrity, authentication, anonymity, and session freshness. We also demonstrate that our proposed scheme is more efficient than the existing schemes with the same security level, due to the reduced number of interactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system generally consists of readers, tags and back-end servers. It is seen as a replacement to the conventional bar code system, which is limited by the verification distance (i.e. very close range or physically near an identification system). In addition, RFID systems generally have larger storage space than a bar code system, and RFID tag has a unique code to resist forgery. Unsurprisingly, due to their low costs and the ability to automatically identify objects without line-of-sight, RFID systems have been applied in different industries and contexts, such as supply chain management, access control systems, theft detection, wireless payments, intelligent transportation systems, tracking of animals, etc.
There are a number of privacy concerning challenges associated with RFID, such as tag path authentication [1] , tag grouping-proof [2] , and tag ownership transfer (OT) [3] . The last one is the focus of this paper. Ownership means that only the owner (or reader) of a tag can access the tag, obtain the highest permissions on the tag, and interact with the tag in a secure way. In many circumstances, it is often necessary to continually transfer the ownership of a tag from an owner to another one during the communication process. When an ownership transfer takes place, the current owner needs to pass the security key that is authenticated with the tag to the new owner. Generally, a secure ownership transfer scheme should achieve the following properties: 1) prevent the key from being stolen by an adversary during the transmission; 2) prevent more than one owner to have control of the tag; and 3) ensure the privacy of the two owners from being compromised by a third-party.
There are a number of ownership transfer protocols proposed in the literature [4] - [8] . These protocols are generally based on symmetric key encryption, additional hash functions or pseudorandom number generators. In this paper, we propose the first RFID ownership transfer protocol based on Chebyshev polynomial mapping. The protocol is designed to achieve the required security attributes in ownership transfer yet with reduced rounds of interaction (i.e. improved computation efficiency and reduced amount of transmission data).
The rest of this paper is sketched as follows. We review related work in Section II. In Section III, we introduce the notion of Chebyshev polynomials, system model and security requirements. In Section IV, we present the new RFID ownership transfer protocol based on Chebyshev polynomials.
We present the security analysis and performance evaluation of the proposed protocol in Sections V and VI, respectively. Conclusion is presented in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In 2005, Molnar et al. [3] proposed the first RFID ownership transfer protocol, assuming the existence of a trusted third party (TTP). Since then, many RFID ownership transfer protocols based on different authentication methods have been presented in the literature [6] - [11] . However, it is quite a challenge to design a secure ownership transfer protocol. For example, Osaka et al. [9] proposed an RFID security protocol based on the hash function and symmetric cryptosystem. Unfortunately, the protocol is unable to resist synchronous attack, tracking attack and forward attack, contrary to the claims of the protocol designers. Similarly, the protocols of Edelev et al. [12] and Zhang et al. [13] are vulnerable to de-synchronization attacks.
Designing an efficient ownership transfer protocol is also a challenging. For example, Doss et al. [14] employed the quadratic residue property to secure ownership transfer in RFID systems according to electronic product code (EPC) Class-1 Gen-2 standards. However, Doss et al.'s scheme needs to exchange information between the tags and both old and new readers repeatedly, which results in a low efficiency. Cao et al. [15] proposed a cloud-based RFID ownership transfer protocol in which a large number of calculations and interactions are required. Cheng et al. [16] proposed the first ownership transfer protocol based on elliptic-curve, which also enables a controlled delegation and authorization recovery. Xin et al. [17] used Elgamal re-encryption technology to resolve linear complexity problems. Xin et al.'s scheme requires a TTP to store all the secrets and expensive calculations are involved (in the authentication phase, readers are required to execute pairing computation for research). Furthermore, both Cheng et al.'s protocol [16] and Xin et al. [17] protocol have seven round interactions in ownership transfer phase which results in a lengthy computation time. Seo et al. [4] proposed a lightweight ownership transfer protocol based on pseudorandom number generator and asymmetric encryption/decryption during ownership transfer. Seo et al.'s protocol, however, has a high communication overhead.
In addition, many of the existing protocols assumed the existence of a TTP (e.g. [3] , [6] , [8] ), which is responsible to distribute the shared keys among RFID tags and readers. On the other hand, in the protocols that omit the assumption of TTP existence, the shared secure keys need to be negotiated among current owners, new owners, and RFID tags.
In this paper, we propose the first RFID ownership transfer protocol based on Chebyshev polynomial. Without affecting security assurances, our proposed protocol has a reduced interaction rounds between tags and readers, which results in a high computation and communication efficiencies.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the notion of Chebyshev polynomial, system model, and security requirements to be used in our proposed scheme.
A. CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL Definition 1 (Chebyshev Polynomial [18] ): Let p be a large prime number and n an integer. The Chebyshev polynomial T n : Z p → Z p of degree n can be defined by the following recurrence relation:
It is easy to check that Chebyshev polynomial satisfies the so-called semi-group property:
(1)
Definition 2 (CP-DL Problem):
The Chebyshev polynomial discrete logarithm (CP-DL) problem can be described as: given x, y ∈ Z * p , find an integer n so that T n (x) = y.
Definition 3 (CP-DH Problem):
The Chebyshev polynomial Diffie-Hellman (CP-DH) problem can be expressed as: given x ∈ Z * p and T r (x), T s (x), compute T rs (x). The hardness of the CP-DL and CP-DH problems had been proven in [18] . 
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Our RFID system consists of three kinds of parties, namely: tags, readers (or owners) and database -see also Figure 1 . Readers and database are assumed to be securely connected and can be viewed as a whole. Our system model dose not require a TTP to maintain information about the current and/or previous ownership of each tag.
In addition, our RFID system has the following specifications. VOLUME 6, 2018 • The initial state information is pre-installed on every tag and reader during factory manufacturing.
• Each tag has a rewritable memory and is able to perform lightweight calculations.
• Each reader is an entity engaged in the transfer of ownership and can communicate with the target tag.
• The communication between a reader and a target tag takes place via an insecure radio frequency channel, while the communication between two readers is assumed to be secure and reliable.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
We assume that there is an adversary A who can eavesdrop on the communication channel between tags and readers, and attempts to carry out the following attacks: 1) Replay Attack: A intercepts the communication information between readers and tags and then sends them repeatedly for subsequent authentication. 2) Man-in-the-Middle Attack: A intercepts and tampers with the communication data between tags and readers, without been detected. 3) De-synchronization Attack: A prevents or tampers with the communication between readers and tags, resulting in the loss of synchronization between both devices and the failure of identity authentication. A secure RFID ownership transfer protocol should mitigate the above attacks, as well as achieving the following properties:
1) Tag Anonymity: The real identify of the tag should not be leaked; otherwise, one's personal privacy will be compromised. 2) Tag Location Privacy: Any adversary should not be able to distinguish between transactions from the same or different tags. Otherwise, the adversary is able to track the tag (or the owner of the tag). 3) Backward Traceability Resilience: Even when A retrieves the secret information from a tag, A is unable to track the new reader of the tag. On the other hand, the old reader is also unable to track the new reader. 4) Forward Traceability Resilience: Even when A retrieves the secret information from a tag, it is unable to track the old reader of the tag. Also the new reader is unable to track the old reader.
IV. OUR RFID OWNERSHIP TRANSFER SCHEME
In this section we propose a new RFID ownership transfer protocol, which consists of three phases, namely: (1) initialization phase; (2) authentication phase; and (3) ownership transfer phase. The notations involved are listed in Table 1 .
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In the initialization phase, the manufacturer, denoted by M, generates system parameters and the public-private key pairs for RFID readers as follows. For simplicity, we assume that there are two readers R and R and one tag T in the proposed protocol. R is the old reader that has T 's ownership and wishes to transfer this ownership to the new reader R . The tag T has identity ID and we denote by ID old and ID new the dynamic identities before and after an ownership transfer, respectively. For a given security parameter κ, M selects a large prime number p satisfying |p| = κ. Then, M sets a time threshold that can be estimated according to different applications. Finally, M chooses a random S ∈ Z * p and a secure hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ . The public system parameters are params = (p, , S, H ).
For readers R and R , M first selects two random positive integers x, x and computes
The public-private key pairs of R and R are (Q, x) and (Q , x ), respectively. Then, M sets ID old = null and ID new = ID. Finally, M sends x to the new reader R and sends x, ID old , ID new to the old reader R, both via a secure channel.
B. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this phase, the old reader R and the tag T authenticate each other to detect unauthorized (or expired) tags or readers. During the authentication process, a timestamp is added to resist replay attack. After the authentication process, both parties R and T update the ID attribute of T . The phase is depicted as follows -see also Figure 2 .
1) The reader R generates a timestamp t 0 and sends it to the tag T . 2) When T receives t 0 from R, it executes the following operations: a) checks whether |t 1 −t 0 |< , where t 1 is the current timestamp of T . If no, T rejects the reader and terminates the authentication process; 
with its identity ID; d) sends M 1 NID t 2 back to R, where t 2 is the current timestamp. 3) Upon receiving the message M 1 NID t 2 from T , R checks the freshness of this message by comparing the current timestamp t 3 with the received t 2 . If the check is failed, then R terminates the authentication process. Otherwise, R executes the following steps with its private key x and the dynamic identities ID old , ID new : a) computes M 2 ≡ T x (M 1 ) mod p based on the received M 1 and its private key x; b) verifies whether the equation 
C. OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PHASE
To transfer the ownership of the tag T from the old reader R to the new reader R , the three parties T , R, and R execute the following interaction process -see also Figure 3 . Note that, according to the security model, the communication channel between R and R is assumed to be secure and reliable.
1) The new reader R sends an ownership transfer request to the old reader R. 2) When R receives the request, R selects a random positive integer y as a temporary secret key and uses it to compute a temporary public key as
Then, R sends ID old ID new y t 0 to R and Y t 0 to T , where t 0 is the current timestamp of R. 3) After receiving the data Y t 0 , T checks the freshness of the data with its current timestamp t 1 . Then, T generates a random positive integer r and computes
and sends M 1 NID t 2 to R . 4) With ID old , ID new , y in hand and the received message M 1 NID t 2 from T , R can authenticate the message as in the authentication phase (see Sec. IV-B). 5) Furthermore, R chooses a random positive integer x and computes Q ≡ T x (S) mod p. Finally, R sends
it checks the freshness of the received message. Then, T verifies whether the equation
holds. If it fails, then T terminates the program. Otherwise, T updates its ID and Q as ID ← ID ⊕ M 2 and Q ← Q .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed ownership transfer protocol according to the security requirements (see Sec. III-C).
A. REPLAY ATTACK RESILIENCE
In our proposed protocol, we used timestamps to resist replay attacks. At each interaction of this protocol, the readers R, R and the tag T attach a timestamp t j synchronized with the message. We set in advance a time threshold to determine whether the difference between the sending and receiving times of transmitted messages is below this threshold. Therefore, even if the adversary A intercepts the message and attempts to reuse it to achieve authentication or ownership transfer, such an action will be detected as the freshness check should be failed. In other words, the message replayed by A will not be successfully authenticated. This shows that our proposed protocol is replay attack resilience. 
B. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK RESILIENCE
It is common for A to intercept some messages transmitted over an insecure channel. Recall that the transmitted messages in our proposed protocol are carefully designed to be some hash values or function values of Chebyshev polynomial. It is difficult for A to obtain the tag's identity and other secret information from the intercepted messages. For example, if A intercepted the message M 1 NID t 2 , it is impossible for A to obtain the secret key x or ID once the CP-DL problem is hard. Thus our proposed protocol is man-in-the-middle attack resilience.
C. DE-SYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK RESILIENCE
During RFID authentication and ownership transfer processes, A can intercept or block some messages. This results in the messages between the reader and the tag not being synchronized. In this case, the reader and the tag cannot authenticate each other in the next interaction. In order to resist such de-synchronization attacks, as described in the proposed protocol, we store the tag's old identity ID old and new identity ID new in the reader's memory. When a desynchronization attack occurs (e.g. A blocks H (ID old M 2 ) t 4 causing the tag unable to update its ID), the reader's memory still has the old ID of the tag in the next interaction. Thus, our protocol is de-synchronization attack resilience.
D. BACKWARD/FORWARD TRACEABILITY RESILIENCE
Our proposed protocol can achieve both the backward and forward traceability resilience. In the proposed protocol, all the messages related to the tag's identity are protected by the user's private key and timestamps. In addition, after the authentication phase and ownership transfer phase have been successfully executed, the tag's identity ID will be updated by the new owner's private key x . In the event that the old reader contacts with the tag, while the tag's identity has been updated by the new reader. When the tag is requested to interact with the old reader, the authenticity of the old reader will be determined.
E. PRIVACY PRESERVATION FOR READERS
The privacy of both the old reader and the new reader are well guaranteed in our proposed protocol. Considering first the privacy of the old reader R. Recall that R chooses a temporary public-private key pair and changes the public key stored in the tag T before the ownership of T is transferred to the new reader R . After transferring the ownership, R cannot reveal the past interactions between T and R because there is no link between the temporary key and the key of R. Therefore, the privacy of R is effectively guaranteed during the ownership transfer phase. On the other hand, we note that R sends an temporary public key Q to T for update after authenticating T . Since the public key of R is protected by the privacy key and the readers are assumed to be trusted in the system, R is not able to extract or change the private key of R . As a result, the future interacted messages between T and R are well-protected and thus the privacy of R is preserved.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our proposed scheme with other three ownership transfer schemes on communication rounds, communication time and the maximum communication overhead.
For the simplicity of description, we assume each Chebyshev polynomial has L-bits length, each identification ID of the tag T has 32-bits length, and each timestamp is denoted as a 32-bits string. Further, we assume that the pseudorandom numbers are of 16-bits in length, the hash values have 128-bits length, the size of symmetric encryption/decryption is 128-bits, and the length of Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is 160-bits. Let T e be the time of an elliptic curve multiplication, T r the time of the random number generation operation, T s the time of a symmetric encryption/descryption, T p the time of a paring operation, T A the time of an asymmetric encryption/descryption, and T c the time of a Chebyshev polynomial computation. According to Chatterjee et al. [21] , we set T c ≈ 0.02102s, T e ≈ 0.063074s, T s ≈ 0.0087s. Finally, we ignore the calculation cost of XOR and hash operation as they are computationally cheap compared to other operations. Table 2 summarizes the efficiency comparison during the ownership transfer phase. It shows that our proposed protocol has a significantly reduced number of interaction rounds and reduced computation cost. Also, the maximum communication overhead of our proposed protocol is minimal compared to the other three related schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an RFID ownership transfer protocol based on Chebyshev polynomials. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed scheme is the first Chebyshev polynomial-based secure ownership transfer protocol. VOLUME 6, 2018 We described the three phases of our proposed scheme in detail, including the initialization phase, the authentication phase, and the ownership transfer phase. Our proposed scheme can effectively reduce the system's communication overhead and memory consumption in comparison to other related schemes. Further, the security analysis shows that our proposed scheme satisfied the requirements of security and privacy protection.
Future research includes implementing a proof-of-concept of the proposed protocol for evaluation in a real-world environment.
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